1 ## I. LAYING PLANS
2 3 Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
4 5 It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
6 7 The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
8 9 These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
10 11 6. _The Moral Law_ causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
12 13 _Heaven_ signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
14 15 _Earth_ comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
16 17 _The Commander_ stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.
18 19 By _Method and discipline_ are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
20 21 These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
22 23 Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
24 25 (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
26 27 (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
28 29 (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
30 31 (5) Which army is the stronger?
32 33 (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
34 35 (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
36 37 By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.
38 39 The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
40 41 While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
42 43 According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans.
44 45 All warfare is based on deception.
46 47 Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
48 49 Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
50 51 If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
52 53 If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
54 55 If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
56 57 If his forces are united, separate them.
58 59 Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
60 61 These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
62 63 Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
64 65 The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.
66 67 "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser.
68 69 ## II. WAGING WAR
70 71 Sun Tzŭ said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,
72 73 with provisions enough to carry them a thousand _li_,
74 75 the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
76 77 When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
78 79 Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
80 81 Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
82 83 Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.
84 85 There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
86 87 It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
88 89 The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-waggons loaded more than twice.
90 91 Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
92 93 Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
94 95 On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
96 97 When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
98 99 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated;
100 101 while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
102 103 Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single _picul_ of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
104 105 Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
106 107 Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
108 109 This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
110 111 In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
112 113 Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
114 115 ## III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
116 117 Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
118 119 Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
120 121 Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans;
122 123 the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces;
124 125 the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field;
126 127 and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
128 129 The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.
130 131 The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months;
132 133 and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
134 135 The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
136 137 with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
138 139 Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
140 141 With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.
142 143 This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
144 145 It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him;
146 147 if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
148 149 If equally matched, we can offer battle;
150 151 if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
152 153 if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
154 155 Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
156 157 Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
158 159 There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
160 161 (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
162 163 (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds.
164 165 (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,
166 167 through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
168 169 But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
170 171 Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
172 173 (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
174 175 (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
176 177 (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
178 179 (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
180 181 Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.
182 183 Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
184 185 If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
186 187 ## IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
188 189 Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
190 191 To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
192 193 Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
194 195 but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
196 197 Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able to _do_ it.
198 199 Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
200 201 Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
202 203 The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;
204 205 he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.
206 207 Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
208 209 To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
210 211 Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
212 213 to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
214 215 What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
216 217 Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
218 219 He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
220 221 Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
222 223 Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
224 225 Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
226 227 The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
228 229 In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
230 231 Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
232 233 A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
234 235 The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.
236 237 ## V. ENERGY
238 239 Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
240 241 Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
242 243 To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct and indirect.
244 245 Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was _cheng_, and the surprise manœuver was _ch’i_." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: "Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of _ch’i_ and _cheng_. Wei Liao Tzŭ says: ‘Direct warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.’ Ts’ao Kung says: ‘Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation; appearing on the enemy’s rear is an indirect manœuver.’ Li Wei-kung says: ‘In war, to march straight ahead is _cheng_; turning movements, on the other hand, are _ch’i_.’ These writers simply regard _cheng_ as _cheng_, and _ch’i_ as _ch’i_; they do not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a circle . A comment on the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: ‘A _ch’i_ manœuver may be _cheng_, if we make the enemy look upon it as _cheng_; then our real attack will be _ch’i_, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.’" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other operation is _cheng_, on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is _ch’i_," which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be _ch’i_," it immediately becomes _cheng_."]
246 247 That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
248 249 In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
250 251 Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more.
252 253 There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
254 255 There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.
256 257 9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.
258 259 In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of manœuvers.
260 261 The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
262 263 The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
264 265 The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
266 267 Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
268 269 Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.
270 271 Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
272 273 Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
274 275 Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision;
276 277 concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
278 279 masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.
280 281 Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.
282 283 He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
284 285 By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
286 287 The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals.
288 289 Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined energy.
290 291 When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.
292 293 Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.
294 295 "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46.
296 297 ## VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
298 299 Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.
300 301 Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
302 303 By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
304 305 If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
306 307 if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
308 309 Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
310 311 An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
312 313 , strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]
314 315 You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.
316 317 You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.
318 319 , making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend…. He who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."]
320 321 Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does not know what to attack.
322 323 O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
324 325 and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
326 327 You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
328 329 If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
330 331 If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.
332 333 By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.
334 335 We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
336 337 And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
338 339 The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points;
340 341 and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
342 343 For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
344 345 Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
346 347 Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
348 349 But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are separated by several _li_!
350 351 Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
352 353 Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
354 355 Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
356 357 Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
358 359 In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them;
360 361 conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.
362 363 How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
364 365 All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
366 367 Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
368 369 Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
370 371 So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
372 373 Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
374 375 Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
376 377 He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.
378 379 The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant;
380 381 the four seasons make way for each other in turn.
382 383 There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
384 385 See Col. Henderson’s biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. 490.
386 387 ## VII. MANŒUVERING
388 389 Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.
390 391 Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.
392 393 After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult.
394 395 The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
396 397 Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_.
398 399 Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
400 401 If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.
402 403 Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
404 405 doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
406 407 The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
408 409 If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
410 411 If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.
412 413 We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
414 415 We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.
416 417 We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
418 419 We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
420 421 In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.
422 423 Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.
424 425 Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
426 427 Let your rapidity be that of the wind,
428 429 your compactness that of the forest.
430 431 In raiding and plundering be like fire,
432 433 in immovability like a mountain.
434 435 Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
436 437 When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men;
438 439 when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
440 441 Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
442 443 He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.
444 445 Such is the art of manœuvering.
446 447 The Book of Army Management says:
448 449 On the field of battle,
450 451 the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
452 453 Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point.
454 455 The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.
456 457 This is the art of handling large masses of men.
458 459 In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
460 461 A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
462 463 a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
464 465 Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning;
466 467 by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
468 469 A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.
470 471 Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
472 473 To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
474 475 To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
476 477 It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
478 479 Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
480 481 Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.
482 483 Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
484 485 When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.
486 487 Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
488 489 Such is the art of warfare.
490 491 See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426.
492 493 For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans, 1907), p. 29.
494 495 ## VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS
496 497 Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.
498 499 When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.
500 501 In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position, you must fight.
502 503 There are roads which must not be followed,
504 505 armies which must be not attacked,
506 507 towns which must not be besieged,
508 509 positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
510 511 The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
512 513 The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.
514 515 So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
516 517 Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.
518 519 If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
520 521 If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.
522 523 Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;
524 525 and make trouble for them,
526 527 and keep them constantly engaged;
528 529 hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
530 531 The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
532 533 There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
534 535 (2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
536 537 (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
538 539 (4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;
540 541 This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion."]
542 543 (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
544 545 These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
546 547 When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.
548 549 "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.
550 551 ## IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH
552 553 Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighbourhood of valleys.
554 555 Camp in high places,
556 557 facing the sun.
558 559 When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.
560 561 If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.
562 563 Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.
564 565 Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
566 567 So much for river warfare.
568 569 In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
570 571 If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.
572 573 So much for operations in salt-marshes.
574 575 In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,
576 577 so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.
578 579 These are the four useful branches of military knowledge
580 581 which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.
582 583 All armies prefer high ground to low,
584 585 and sunny places to dark.
586 587 If you are careful of your men,
588 589 and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,
590 591 and this will spell victory.
592 593 When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground.
594 595 When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
596 597 Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,
598 599 The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom."]
600 601 confined places,
602 603 tangled thickets,
604 605 and crevasses,
606 607 should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
608 609 While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.
610 611 If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.
612 613 When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position.
614 615 When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance.
616 617 If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.
618 619 Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.
620 621 The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.
622 623 The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.
624 625 Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.
626 627 When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry.
628 629 When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.
630 631 Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance.
632 633 Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat.
634 635 When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
636 637 Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
638 639 When there is much running about
640 641 and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come.
642 643 When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.
644 645 When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food.
646 647 If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.
648 649 If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.
650 651 If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.
652 653 Clamour by night betokens nervousness.
654 655 If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.
656 657 When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food,
658 659 and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death.
660 661 The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.
662 663 Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources;
664 665 too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.
666 667 To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
668 669 When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.
670 671 If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
672 673 If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made.
674 675 What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.
676 677 He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
678 679 If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.
680 681 Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.
682 683 said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."]
684 685 This is a certain road to victory.
686 687 If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
688 689 If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed,
690 691 the gain will be mutual.
692 693 "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.
694 695 ## X. TERRAIN
696 697 Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground;
698 699 (2) entangling ground;
700 701 (3) temporising ground;
702 703 (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.
704 705 Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called _accessible_.
706 707 With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies.
708 709 we could wish that Sun Tzŭ had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender of his whole army."
710 711 Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
712 713 Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called _entangling_.
714 715 From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
716 717 When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called _temporising_ ground.
718 719 In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait,
720 721 it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
722 723 With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
724 725 Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
726 727 With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.
728 729 . Chang Yu tells the following anecdote of P’ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P’ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P’ei Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From this it may be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are immune from disastrous floods."]
730 731 If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
732 733 If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle,
734 735 and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
736 737 These six are the principles connected with Earth.
738 739 The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.
740 741 Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.
742 743 Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the former.
744 745 When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is _insubordination_.
746 747 , who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against Wang T’ing-ts’ou. But the whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a time. T’ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.]
748 749 When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is _collapse_.
750 751 When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_.
752 753 When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;
754 755 Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a military leader is difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation."]
756 757 when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,
758 759 and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter _disorganisation_.
760 761 When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a _rout_.
762 763 These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.
764 765 The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;
766 767 but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
768 769 He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will surely be defeated.
770 771 If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding.
772 773 ." This means that "in matters lying outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."]
774 775 The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace,
776 777 whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
778 779 Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.
780 781 If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.
782 783 If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
784 785 If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
786 787 If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
788 789 Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
790 791 Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.
792 793 See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.
794 795 "The Science of War," chap. 2.
796 797 "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.
798 799 ## XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
800 801 Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
802 803 When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
804 805 When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
806 807 Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
808 809 Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
810 811 Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,
812 813 so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,
814 815 is ground of intersecting highways.
816 817 When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
818 819 Mountain forests,
820 821 rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
822 823 Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
824 825 Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.
826 827 On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.
828 829 On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.
830 831 On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
832 833 On serious ground, gather in plunder.
834 835 Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not ‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’" Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy."]
836 837 In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
838 839 On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
840 841 When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile.
842 843 On desperate ground, fight.
844 845 Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear;
846 847 to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men.
848 849 When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.
850 851 When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
852 853 If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."
854 855 By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other side on the defensive.]
856 857 Rapidity is the essence of war:
858 859 In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. This is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.]
860 861 take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
862 863 The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.
864 865 Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.
866 867 Carefully study the well-being of your men,
868 869 and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.
870 871 Keep your army continually on the move,
872 873 and devise unfathomable plans.
874 875 Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.
876 877 Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.
878 879 Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
880 881 Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on the _qui vive;_ without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;
882 883 without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted.
884 885 Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.
886 887 If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity.
888 889 On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,
890 891 those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
892 893 But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
894 895 The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the _shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains.
896 897 Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.
898 899 Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_,
900 901 I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yüeh are enemies;
902 903 yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other’s assistance just as the left hand helps the right.
904 905 Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.
906 907 It is not enough, says Sun Tzŭ, to render flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the _shuai-jan_.]
908 909 The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach.
910 911 as though one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington’s seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in this important particular—unity of spirit and courage. Had he not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.]
912 913 How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question involving the proper use of ground.
914 915 Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.
916 917 It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
918 919 He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances,
920 921 and thus keep them in total ignorance.
922 923 In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47 of the _Hou Han Shu_, "Pan Ch’ao took the field with 25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to succour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t’ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch’ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and said: ‘Our forces are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the evening drum has sounded and then start.’ Pan Ch’ao now secretly released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch’ao’s retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch’ao knew that the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch’ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From that time forward, Pan Ch’ao’s prestige completely overawed the countries of the west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.]
924 925 By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,
926 927 he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
928 929 By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
930 931 At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
932 933 He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and none knows whither he is going.
934 935 To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the business of the general.
936 937 The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;
938 939 the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.
940 941 When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
942 943 When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground.
944 945 When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
946 947 When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.
948 949 When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
950 951 Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose.
952 953 On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
954 955 On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
956 957 On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
958 959 On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.
960 961 On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
962 963 On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.
964 965 On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
966 967 Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the death." Mei Yao-ch’en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzŭ has to say about "grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzŭ begins abruptly in VIII. § 2 to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us down to § 14. In §§ 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzŭ’s text, a few suggestive facts maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzŭ’s work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.]
968 969 For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
970 971 We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
972 973 To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
974 975 When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
976 977 Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
978 979 Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
980 981 Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
982 983 issue orders
984 985 without regard to previous arrangements;
986 987 and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man.
988 989 Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design.
990 991 When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
992 993 Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.
994 995 You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: ‘Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive’? Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the Military Classic—‘Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.’ If I had not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have been a general _débandade_, and it would have been impossible to do anything with them." The officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." ]
996 997 For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.
998 999 Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy’s purpose.
1000 1001 By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank,
1002 1003 we shall succeed in the long run
1004 1005 in killing the commander-in-chief.
1006 1007 This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
1008 1009 On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,
1010 1011 and stop the passage of all emissaries.
1012 1013 Be stern in the council-chamber,
1014 1015 so that you may control the situation.
1016 1017 If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
1018 1019 Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,
1020 1021 and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.
1022 1023 Walk in the path defined by rule,
1024 1025 and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
1026 1027 At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.
1028 1029 Giles’ Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.
1030 1031 "The Science of War," p. 333.
1032 1033 "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.
1034 1035 ## XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE
1036 1037 Sun Tzŭ said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;
1038 1039 , found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu . In consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.’ The officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is today,’ he cried, ‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors.’ All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king’s sons as hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku." _Hou Han Shu_, ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ]
1040 1041 the second is to burn stores;
1042 1043 the third is to burn baggage-trains;
1044 1045 the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;
1046 1047 the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.
1048 1049 In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available.
1050 1051 the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.
1052 1053 There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration.
1054 1055 The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;
1056 1057 for these four are all days of rising wind.
1058 1059 In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:
1060 1061 (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an attack from without.
1062 1063 (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
1064 1065 (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.
1066 1067 (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment.
1068 1069 Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T’ien Tan.’ That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." ] ] ] ] ]
1070 1071 (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
1072 1073 A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.
1074 1075 In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.
1076 1077 Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.
1078 1079 By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.
1080 1081 Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation.
1082 1083 Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.
1084 1085 Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.
1086 1087 No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.
1088 1089 If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.
1090 1091 Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.
1092 1093 But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being;
1094 1095 nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.
1096 1097 Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.
1098 1099 "Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger’s cubs."
1100 1101 ## XIII. THE USE OF SPIES
1102 1103 Sun Tzŭ said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.
1104 1105 There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
1106 1107 As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor.
1108 1109 In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of
1110 1111 000 families would be affected.]
1112 1113 Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments,
1114 1115 is the height of inhumanity.
1116 1117 One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
1118 1119 character for ‘prowess’ is made up of ‘to stay’ and ‘a spear’ (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."]
1120 1121 Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is _foreknowledge_.
1122 1123 Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
1124 1125 cannot be gained by reasoning from other analogous cases."]
1126 1127 nor by any deductive calculation.
1128 1129 Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
1130 1131 Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
1132 1133 When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty.
1134 1135 Having _local spies_ means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.
1136 1137 Having _inward spies_, making use of officials of the enemy.
1138 1139 Having _converted spies_, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them for our own purposes.
1140 1141 Having _doomed spies_, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.
1142 1143 _Surviving spies_, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy’s camp.
1144 1145 sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy’s uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the enemy’s camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their horses again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible information about the enemy’s dispositions, and received warm commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."]
1146 1147 Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.
1148 1149 None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.
1150 1151 Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.
1152 1153 They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.
1154 1155 Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.
1156 1157 Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business.
1158 1159 If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.
1160 1161 are carried out," etc. Sun Tzŭ’s main point in this passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, as Ch’en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzŭ lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of him."]
1162 1163 Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de- camp,
1164 1165 the door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.
1166 1167 The enemy’s spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service.
1168 1169 It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.
1170 1171 It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.
1172 1173 Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions.
1174 1175 The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
1176 1177 Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.
1178 1179 Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty
1180 1181 who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lü Ya
1182 1183 who had served under the Yin.
1184 1185 Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.
1186 1187 Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s ability to move.
1188 1189 "Aids to Scouting," p. 2.
1190 1191 "Marshal Turenne," p. 311.
1192